(Via Irregular Analyses) There's a very interesting new study up on the Army War College's website titled "Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency", by Dr. Max G. Manwaring. It analyzes something that the 4GW crowd has been articulating for some time, regarding the increasing convergence of the last 10-15 years between criminal activity and terroristic or guerilla warfare activity. (See, e.g., "Anticipating the Nature of the Next Conflict", by Col G. I. Wilson, USMCR, Maj Frank Bunkers, USMCR, and Sgt John P. Sullivan, LA County Sheriff's Dept., April 2001.) This particular article focuses on the manifestations of that trend in the urban environment, and that street gangs may eventually evolve into a form of insurgency that tries to directly oppose the state. "Although there are differences between gangs and insurgents regarding motives and modes of operations, this linkage infers that gang phenomena are mutated forms of urban insurgency."

[For an interesting study of how military and law enforcement agencies can conduct intelligence preparation of the urban battlespace to counteract this threat, see this RAND study by Jamie Medby. And for a case-study on Chechnya that looks at this phenomenon of crime-war convergence, among other things, check out "Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat" by Olga Olikerl. Plus, I recommend Chris Fair's "Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan", containing some observations relating to this trend as well.]

This trend is apparently at work in Iraq right now, according to this front-page L.A. Times report noting the increasing criminal violence in that nation that is not tied to the insurgency. According to the story:

Assassinations and bombings have garnered worldwide attention. But Iraqi officials say violence unrelated to the insurgency is growing, and Iraqis are more likely to die at the hands — or in the cross-fire — of kidnappers, carjackers and angry neighbors than in car bombings.

In some cases, authorities say, the motives are so opaque that they cannot tell whether they are investigating a crime disguised as an act of war or a political assassination masquerading as a violent business dispute.

In Baghdad alone, officials at the central morgue counted 8,035 deaths by unnatural causes in 2004, up from 6,012 the previous year, when the U.S. invaded Iraq. In 2002, the final year of Saddam Hussein's regime, the morgue examined about 1,800 bodies.

Of the deaths occurring now, 60% are caused by gunshot wounds, officials say, and most are unrelated to the insurgency. Twenty to 30 bodies arrive at the morgue every day, and the victims are overwhelmingly male.

Much of the violence, officials say, is inspired by the ethnic, tribal and religious rivalries that were held in check by Hussein's brutal rule, and facilitated by a ready supply of firearms. That deadly combination has let loose a wave of vengeance killings, tribal vendettas, mercenary kidnappings and thievery.

"The only virtue of the old regime is that Iraq enjoyed a state of stability," said Lt. Faris Jubrail of the Baghdad police. "It was a reaction to the huge size of punishment that the regime would practice. This would never have happened then."

Police say they are also growing increasingly worried about the recent arrival of organized criminal groups who trade in arms, drugs and stolen cars and blackmail people. In some cases, police say, insurgents have paid gangs of thugs to kidnap doctors and engineers or kill barbers for giving Western-style haircuts.

Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, echoed the police, saying Tuesday in Baghdad that criminals-for-hire were playing a growing role in the insurgency.

Police say the gangs aren't motivated by a desire to end the occupation; they're just looking to make a buck.

Analysis: There are many implications to this story, but I'd to focus on one. The operational environment in Iraq is very complex — meaning that it is populated by myriad actors with varying motivations and objectives. Suffice to say, the U.S. military and the Iraq security forces don't merely face a threat from the insurgency; they must also deal with the threat posed by street crime and other problems with threaten order and stability. If left unchecked, these criminal enterprises can ultimately mature into very dangerous adversaries indeed, of the sort seen in Colombia or even Somalia and Afghanistan. Stamping out the insurgency is necessary, but not sufficient. The Iraqis must also establish police forces capable of actual law enforcement, as well as civil justice systems capable of actually adjudicating cases. And ultimately, the Iraqis must create a civil society that does not tolerate such rampant lawlessness. Even if the insurgency is eventually neutralized, the average Iraqi will continue to live in fear if these criminal elements are not dealt with. Soldiers and military force cannot deal with this threat alone; it must be eliminated using a combination of military, law enforcement, intelligence and legal capabilities.

Update I: For more interesting analysis on this subject, see "Street Gangs & Insurgency" at the Stygius website, and "Transnational Gangs" at John Robb's Global Guerillas site.

Update II: Bryan Bender of the Boston Globe covers these developments and links them to some ongoing discussion in Washington about how to deal with them. For what it's worth, I think the Pentagon is riding the wave on this one. The MP, MI and special operations communities have known for some time about this issue, and have dealt with it operationally in places like Bosnia, Kosovo and Colombia. It will be interesting to see how the military applies this experience to the crime/war problem in Iraq.