Quick. What do Japan, Germany, South Korea, Djibouti, Qatar, and Kyrgyzstan all have in common?

Not much, except that they are all host nations to United States military bases. The first three have hosted massive numbers of American service members since early in the Cold War, while the smaller, poorer countries only recently acquired their contingents. This development in American global basing, and the resulting tensions, are well illustrated by the current spat between the US and the autocrat in charge of Uzbekhistan. Some key grafs:

For now, Washington has not gone along with a European proposal to issue an ultimatum to Karimov to agree to an international inquiry with a deadline to reply, or face new sanctions in the form of an arms embargo and a visa ban for diplomats, European envoys said. U.S. officials said they believe that backing Karimov into a corner is not an effective way to win cooperation (emphases mine).

The stakes are high, since the United States has relied on the Uzbek base at Karshi Khanabad, known as K-2, for military and humanitarian missions in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, which was one of the first republics to ask Russian troops to leave after the Soviet Union collapsed, has reflected new U.S. influence in Central Asia.

Uzbekistan also symbolizes the central dilemma in U.S. foreign policy over whether democracy or fighting terrorism takes precedence. The Pentagon, facing limited alternatives, wants to keep access to the base; the State Department has advocated a tougher line on political change as the key to prevent further unrest.

The tensions between Washington and Tashkent have offered Russia and China an opportunity to squeeze the United States out of Central Asia. Russia, China and four Central Asian nations — Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan — demanded this month that the United States declare a date for withdrawing troops and aircraft from bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Analysis: The fact that the US does not want to “back Karimov into a corner” (and Europe apparently does) contrasts with its strategy for North Korea and Iran. It’s an inevitable side effect of a completely revised US basing strategy that deserves more attention. For multiple reasons--containing China, protecting oil supplies as well as prosecuting the War on Terror--United States bases have mushroomed throughout the world in recent years, with more to come.

Cold War bases were located in large countries destined to be economic and geopolitical powerhouses, where the US had vital interests in stability, prosperity and alignment with the United States. Service members and their families moved to the equivalent of medium-sized American towns (replete with schools and bowling alleys) for years at a time. They represented a nice convergence of realpolitik, democratization and economic development in one strategy.

The newer host countries present a stark contrast. Many are practically city-states with little economic potential, non-democratic or unstable governments, but in strategic locations. The bases are extremely spare, where six month tours with no family are the rule and therefore requiring very few “hotel services” to help drive a sizable local economy (the hosts are so poor that bases still represent a windfall; Kyrgyzstan's accounted for 5 percent of its entire gross domestic product last year). The bases are likely to be removed from host populations and heavily fortified, and are unlikely to do much to increase stability, democracy or familiarity with Americans in their hosts.

The Cold War bases’ primary message was long term commitment, a presence so large and permanent that any attack on the host (i.e. Warsaw Pact on Western Germany) would guarantee a United States response. The current basing strategies' intention appears to be the precise opposite; ephemeral, multiple staging points for neo-Mahanian “coaling stations” that help avoid a repeat of the Turkish rejection during the Iraq War (small countries are easier to bribe, and if Kyrgyzstan won’t play ball perhaps Uzbekistan will). We're not there to defend Djibouti, we're there to conduct offensive operations in Yemen, Somalia, etc. Small wonder the Chinese and Russians are worried about the 'Stans.

So these bases give American forces tremendous strategic flexibility with little commitment, but at what cost? Without assurance that the U.S. is in for the long haul and knowing the U.S. has other basing options, states are unlikely to democratize, exhibit much stability, or resist pressure from powerful neighbors (not to mention terrorist attacks). Consider the embarrassment if a coup takes place in a host state and the U.S. does little about it. Couple this with the potential for damage in relations with major powers whose cooperation we require in the War on Terror (and who will not a direct threat to U.S. interests for a long time coming), and the deal may not look so good anymore.

Part of the problem is the attempt to commingle two important American conservative foreign policy instincts, preponderance and isolationism. This bipolar desire for overwhelming power everywhere while sticking our necks out nowhere is exemplified by the new basing strategy (more to follow on this).

U.S. bases can be a source of regional stability; we should remember the many ancillary advantages to long-term military basing in large countries with economic and democratic potential, rather than simply creating disposable launching pads. If you are going to antagonize Russia, antagonize it from the Ukraine and Romania, rather than the ‘Stans. Or at the very least, build a McDonalds on every new base.