House to House
[Phillip Carter,
Tuesday September 25, 2007 at 10:27am ]
In last month's Washington Monthly, my friend Clint Douglas penned a brilliant review essay of David Bellavia's new combat memoir "House to House." If you follow military blogs or websites, you might've heard of Staff Sgt. Bellavia -- an infantryman who fought in the second battle of Fallujah, earning the Silver Star for leading his squad and single-handedly killing six insurgents. Douglas, who knows something of combat from his tour in Afghanistan as an Army Special Forces NCO, pans the book for its editorializing and overwrought descriptions of events. But the best part of the review comes at the end, where Douglas writes about the larger questions raised by Bellavia's memoir and thinking about combat:There’s another problem within this book, and it has less to do with the telling of the story than what lies at the heart of it. Bellavia deeply believes in the cause for which he and his comrades fought, and wants the reader to believe too. “Fallujah will never be just another battlefield,” he writes in the book’s closing pages. “It was here that we fought for hope.” And yet the reader of House to House is left with nagging questions: What was gained in Fallujah? What did all of the blood and sacrifice accomplish within the larger context of the war? We won the battle of Fallujah, but how did this advance American objectives in Iraq? How did it fit into a greater strategy?Well said.
The answer to this last question, of course, is that it didn’t. There was no comprehensive strategy. The first battle of Fallujah (dubbed by some Marines who fought in it as “Operation Just Kidding”) was halted prematurely, making the Americans appear both weak and irresolute. In the second battle—the one in which Bellavia and his men fought—the city was effectively razed, but that still didn’t mark a positive turning point in the conflict. Many of the insurgents, who’d based themselves in Fallujah, simply pulled out before the American onslaught and went on to spread the insurgency elsewhere in the country. The vast majority of American forces arrayed for the operation were ordered back to their sprawling bases afterward. The military failed to secure the population, and the occupation continued much as it had before.
In retrospect we know why. We were fighting insurgents in exactly the wrong way; you do not beat an insurgency by destroying a whole city. At one point in the fighting Bellavia notes, “We don’t give a shit about stirring up the locals; as far as we’re concerned, they’re already stirred up. Using maximum force is exactly what we want to do.” This may be an appropriate sentiment for an infantry NCO, but it is exactly the wrong strategy to win a guerilla war. I shed no tears for the deaths of jihadis anywhere; indeed, it was my pleasure to chase them around the mountains of eastern Afghanistan in 2003. But if we’re not fighting for the locals, then why the hell are we there?
We finally have a general in command in Iraq, David Petraeus, who literally wrote the book on counterinsurgency. American strategy has changed at last. The extra troops in the “surge” have provided security for many Iraqis and forestalled at least some sectarian killings. Progress has been made in recruiting Baathist insurgents to fight al-Qaeda. Al-Anbar Province, once the heart of the insurgency, is increasingly quiet, in part because we are now arming the very insurgents who were shooting at us. Our armed forces have learned from the mistakes of the past. But is it all too late? The American public is tired of the war in Iraq, and the Bush administration no longer has any credibility. There is broad agreement that the additional troop levels cannot be maintained for long. The overall Sunni-Shiite divide has never been deeper, and ethnic cleansing continues. We are finding ourselves backing both sides in a civil war. A political compromise between the factions remains as elusive as ever, and the Shiite-led government is only marginally better than dysfunctional. And as I write this, the Iraqi parliament is on vacation, while American soldiers continue to fight and die.
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That, as they say, is a good question.
CD: "We finally have a general in command in Iraq, David Petraeus, who literally wrote the book on counterinsurgency. American strategy has changed at last. The extra troops in the 'surge' have provided security for many Iraqis and forestalled at least some sectarian killings. Progress has been made in recruiting Baathist insurgents to fight al-Qaeda. Al-Anbar Province, once the heart of the insurgency, is increasingly quiet, in part because we are now arming the very insurgents who were shooting at us. Our armed forces have learned from the mistakes of the past. But is it all too late?"
Obviously, it is too late to warn against drinking the Bush kool-aid.
I fail to detect a "change in strategy". Let's not confuse operations with strategy (i.e. policy).
The political policy is to stay indefinitely, or to postpone withdrawal until the next President takes office, so that withdrawal can be the occasion to blame the next President for the failure of an imperial policy, incompetently executed.
I think Bush and company had some policy objective in invading Iraq. I can only guess at what it was, though. The P.R. imperatives and, maybe, domestic (or internal-administration?) coalition-building, required a lot of lies and ambiguity. If I don't know the American policy goal in Iraq, and C. Douglas does not, I'm pretty sure Petraeus does not, either, let alone randomly-selected NCOs.
I am as ready as anyone to believe that whatever Petraeus has been doing in Iraq with 'the surge' has some internal, logical coherance. What I don't see is any relation to any legitimate and agreed-upon national purpose, let alone "progress" in relation to that purpose. The absence of any kind of economic and political reconstruction effort, proportionate to the Iraqi meltdown would make any military achievements dubious in the best circumstances, but it is really hard to detect even military achievements, with political significance.
Is failure and its author so hard to recognize?
Of course, his job at training the Iraqi Army didn't go so well. But we're not supposed to comment on things like that. Good Americans understand that history is dangerous, and the sad parts are not to be dwelt upon.
given that 'victory' in any form that this forum would agree with is impossible, is it enough to avoid 'defeat'?
assuming of course we don't go invade iran.
That's in the US, of course. Internationally, the Iraq war is going to be a stain on America for a very long time.
It isn't a "plan" at all. It isn't a sequence of actions,
which, if properly executed, will lead to the goal of a stable
peaceful Iraq. We're hanging around, and doing stuff, in the
*hope* that the leaders of Iraq's various factions will
decide to sit down, talk seriously, and make a deal. But
they don't see any point in making that deal while we're
hanging around tipping the balance of power. We're going
to leave; then they're going to fight until they agree
on their relative strength (and unfortunately, all sides
will have lots of weapons we've paid for); and finally,
they'll come to some kind of agreement or at least a
stalemate.
Hope is not a plan.
"Learning to fight with the Iraqi army is something of real value that was achieved, even when the strategy was badly calculated."
One wonders about the "value" of tactics exquisitely executed in support of a gravely flawed strategy. This is especially true when the strategy shows no sign of improving. "The operation was a success, but the patient died."
"Do the "leaders" in Baghdad matter when we have the local leaders, concerned citizens committees and Iraqi army fightng with us?"
Oh, yes.
Local leaders can and will change their minds about the value of a government that ignores them. Concerned citizen committees are more concerned about survival than extending the central government's reach.
The Iraqi Army is doing its best but is hamstrung by so many factors (especially lack of support from the central government) that it requires constant assistance from the US Army merely to continue to exist. Any reduction of assistance from the US (as will occur when the "Surge" turns into the "Reduction") will probably finish the IA.
I haven't heard anything about the Iraqi Police force in a while. Any idea if they are getting better or staying the same?
Not good.
Iraq Police Report
"The Iraqi national police force is riddled with militia and corruption and should be disbanded, a panel of retired US military officers has told Congress."
...
"The commission members, who spent three weeks in Iraq this summer and conducted 150 interviews, were most damning about the Iraqi national police. They said that its parent body, the Interior Ministry, was a ministry “in name only” and rife with sectarianism and corruption. The entire 26,000-member police force should be scrapped and rebuilt anew, they said."
If you only respect soldiers who believe deeply in what they are doing then there are a vast number of soldiers you disdain. (although I suspect you didn't mean it literally)
Seems to me that statements like that feed into the deification of the military that you say you find troubling. The notion that every "good" soldier is a true believer in the "cause" is very totalitarian one.
More soldiers say they fight for their buddies than for "the mission".
Embrace partition, dude. If you look at other areas with similar histories of multi-ethnic and religious strife, partition is the likely long-term solution. It happened in India after independence, in the Balkans after the fall of communism, in Europe after the end of the Habsburgs. Compared to those times and places, Iraq is not doing badly.
Well, actually, PA NCO, truth be told, there are a hell of lot of soldiers of all ranks whom I've disdained over the years. Even managed to assist some—officers and enlisted—out of the ranks.
Maybe I expressed myself clumsily. I was speaking from a combat, not a political perspective. I don't want to be there with people who approach their duties half-heartedly. Been there, done that. I mean, I could get hurt. And since I'm pretty important to me, that wouldn't be a good thing. You're absolutely right about why line troops do it, BTW, but it is sometimes different from a leader, i.e., officer or senior NCO, standpoint, where mission is all.
Frankly, I don't give a shit about the troops' political leanings, how they vote, or whether they think they're doing it for George Bush, their buddies, world peace, or for me. I just want them to do the job, like they believe in it, no matter how much it sucks. And I want them to do it, as ordered, and without committing war crimes, until the mission is no longer there. That is what soldiers do.
Unlike the media and certain politicians, I don't treasure the political thoughts of 25-year-olds, who by virtue of their decision to stay with it, have already told me how they feel about it. In short, I don't need tactical-level opinions to reach my own conclusions about this Iraq adventure. I still recall my father and several uncles, all of whom had served in WW2, responding to my stories in 1969 about the wonderful Vietnamese with whom I'd worked and how we were making it and were just almost there. The responses were kind of, "you don't understand, kid, the horse has left the barn. You've done a great job, got your medals, didn't get hurt much, but this turkey is done."
I embraced partition quite a long time ago, I consider it to be the only semi-hopeful plan left for Iraq. The problem is that the Sunnis and the Shi'a both seem to be embracing total victory instead of partition and are rounding up external allies to help them achieve their goal.
I agree with your comments. The embrace of total victory is a big problem. It is also something that could abandoned quickly.
Does anyone posting here ever think about the intelligence value of being in Iraq? Jihadis from all over the world come to Iraq to kill Americans. The US military is out there patrolling every day with local, Arabic-speaking troops at their side. They detain people interrogate them, release them. If your goal is to penetrate Jihadi networks, this is a target-rich environment. I believe the US military is exploiting this opportunity big-time, though I have no specific information to support this belief
All of the time.
"Jihadis from all over the world come to Iraq to kill Americans. The US military is out there patrolling every day with local, Arabic-speaking troops at their side. They detain people interrogate them, release them. If your goal is to penetrate Jihadi networks, this is a target-rich environment. I believe the US military is exploiting this opportunity big-time, though I have no specific information to support this belief"
Off the top of my head, I can think of at least three major considerations, all intertwined.
1. Given the belief system and motivations involved, the targets should not be expected to be all that susceptible.
2. Given the track record, it would take a great leap of faith to arbitrarily trust the local national interpreter.
3. Falling prey to disinformation operations, always a risk, poses an exceptionally high degree of risk in this particular environment.
Your remarks above seem to be on the "flypaper strategy" level of inanity. Given that most of the insurgents are in fact not foreign, I doubt that much intelligence of value beyond that pertaining to local conditions can be extracted.
Our many missteps in Iraq may be contributing to what is called "blowback." Also our actions in Iraq may have soured relations with the Islamic world to the point that we may not be getting useful intelligence on attacks that may be in planning stages against the United States.
Keep whistling in the dark if it makes you feel better.
Hate to disagree with you but I've noticed that conflicts tend to take on a life of their own, especially in the ME, and keep consuming people long after the leaders have given up on the original goal.
Are relations really worse than they were before Iraq? Heh. 9-11 attack and many previous attacks emanating from the Islamic world occurred before the coalition overthrow of SH.
Given the belief system and motivations involved, the targets should not be expected to be all that susceptible
Don't most of the insurgents get paid for their work? Hard to believe there are not some who can be bribed into spying? And many of the suicide bombers are junkies with heavy opiate use in the days before the attack. Reportedly AQ looks for people who are susceptible to coercion to be suicide bombers. Suicide bombers who are captured before killing themselves is another population where double agents, spies and assassins might be recruited.
Just as normal catholics all over the world did not support the violent wing of the IRA, so most muslims condemned AQ after 9/11, you have to remember that. But by the enormous catastrophe that is Iraq, with hundreds of thousand real people with families dead, by the idiocy of Abu Ghraib and Gitmo, by the institutionalization of torture and the abandonment of the UN, the US has lost any moral superiority it might have once had. Most muslims I talk to shake their heads and think its about drugs, cash and insanity on *both* sides now, whereas just after 9/11 many were severly shocked and keen on reform.
As for the usefulness of maintaining a killing ground in Iraq indefinetly, dont you think that this suits the AQ just fine? They get to practice just as much as the US does, after all, with the survivors gaining veteran-status. Afghanistan turned out the first such generation of warriors, Bosnia the second, and now Iraq is turning out the third. ANd because it is a occupation of a muslim country in the muslim heartlands, the US has ensured that they have a surplus of recruits. Now that they have secured Pashtunia/Waziristan and in praxis seceeded from Pakistan, they have their own geographical landmass, their own internal (drug)economy, in short they have evolved into a semi-corporate entity with a moral parity to the opposition. All this thanks to the invasion of Iraq by GWB jr. Heck of a JOB, both literally and biblically.
I accept that as true, but a significant minority of Muslims were inspired by 9-11. The Palestinians danced in the streets, a cleric in London made a poster with the photos of the hijackers, calling them "The Magnicifent Nineteen." If any event in the last few years created a surplus of recruits for AQ, it was the 9-11 attacks, not the liberation of Iraq. In fact, in Iraq we have recruited more Middle Easterners to our side than AQ. The Iraqi army is 150,000 plus and growing. The Iraqi army is winning firefights with AQ, not the reverse.
Well, the dancing palestinians I do seem to remember turned out to be something of a media-construction, along the lines of the toppling of the S. Hussein story and the Mission Accomplished banner wich just happened to be on a aricarrier.. And the mullahs of the London fanatics are not much different from the christians saluting Timothy mcVeigh as a saint, wich I dont think can be said to constitute a "significant minority of Christians".
You have to separate between top layer of froth and the deeper levels beneath. Remember that Al Jazeera shows pictures of a lot of very dead people every day, something we in the west have decided we dont need to see. If you knew the Iranians were occupying Canada and had killed many many thousands of Canadians, how would you react? I tiotally disagree with you that 9/11 functioned as a recruiting poster for AQ, because the following invasion of Afghanistan almost had them wiped out. Until Iraq, for wich invasion no obvious reason can be found, except for greed and eggheadedness.
http://watch.windsofchange.net/themes_09.htm
After 9-11 and before we invaded Iraq, AQ managed to behed Daniel Pearl and release a propaganda video of it, pull of the Bali bombings and send the Shoe Bomber manque up on a transatlantic flight.
By the wat, I am unable to find any instances of Christians saluting Timothy MecViegh as a saint. Did this happen?
Those rebels, the Cristeros, received a lot of financial and moral support from their co-religionists within the United States. In fact, the U.S. government finally dragged Mexico City to make peace with the rebels --- by, ah ... how to phrase this ... granting all their demands --- through a threat to suspend the Neutrality Acts and let the weapons openly flow.
Is there a greater moral here? Nah. Just as there's no greater moral in what some Palestinians did and others did not after 9-11.
But it is a neat story, and an optimistic one if you squint hard and think about it right. Plus, all knowledge of things Mexican is good for your health.
Say, does anyone know if MSR is all right? I'm kinda worried about his absence.